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In the Supreme Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
FRANK D. WATKINS and VENIA 
WATKINS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
GLEN M. SIMONDS and BEVERLY 
J. SIMONDS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9131 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs brought an action on June 12, 1958, 
to- restrain defendants from blocking the flow of water 
through a certain ditch on the defendants' property and 
to require them to clear said ditch and enjoin future 
blocking of said ditch. 
A temporary restraining order was issued and after 
a hearing on the order, the court took the matter under 
advisement on June 16, 1958. Judge Martin M. Larson 
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at that time refused to require the removal of the obstruc-
tion until September 10, 1958, when Judge Larson entered 
an order continuing the restraining order, and on Sep-
tember 26, 1958, entered a further order allowing the 
plaintiffs to open the ditch until the matter was heard on 
its merits. 
The defendants moved for summary judgment and 
subsequently plaintiffs filed an amended complaint 
which was answered by the defendants. Plaintiffs also 
filed a motion for summary judgment. The motions were 
noticed by the defendant and were heard by the court on 
July 16, 19·59. Defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment was granted, plaintiffs' motion dismissed, and the 
summary judgment entered on July 31, 1959. 
The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint 
without leave of court, and on the 11th day of August, 
1959, filed a motion to set aside judgment, to amend and 
to maintain the status quo. 
The court refused the ex parte application of the 
plaintiffs to set aside judgment, and denied leave to 
amend on the same date. On the 24th day of August, 
1959, plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial (R. 57) and 
a motion to _alter summary judgment and to amend 
(R. 58). Both motions were denied by the court in an 
order dated August 31, 1959. On August 29, 1959, plain-
tiffs filed a notice of appeal. 
Prior to the entry of summary judgment on July 31, 
1959, the court considered the memoranda submitted at 
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the request of the plaintiffs and without objection by 
the defendants, said memoranda being to clarify plain-
tiffs' contention as to the facts set forth in the first 
amended cornplaint which "\vere taken as admitted by 
defendants for purposes of the summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF TI-lE FACTS 
This statement of facts is set forth as taken fron1 
plaintiffs' amended complaint (R. 12-19) and the plain-
tiffs' mernoranda (R. 40-50), together with plaintiffs' 
diagram (R. 50), and not as reconstructed and altered 
in plaintiffs' brief. 
The parties are owners of Lots 6 (plaintiffs') and B 
(defendants'), Block 2, Holladay Heights Plat "A", Salt 
Lake County. Plaintiffs acquired Lot 6 through various 
conveyances from Alliance Realty Company, who con-
veyed to plaintiffs' predecessor on December 19, 1950 
(R. 41). Alliance Realty ·Company had not yet acquired 
Lot 3, which was acquired on July 20, 1951, and conveyed 
to defendants' predecessor on December 31, 1952 (see 
plaintiffs' memoranda, R. 41). 
In 1950 and previous thereto, water had come to Lot 
6 by a ditch along the south side of Block 1, Holladay 
Heights Plat "A", along Lots 5 to 8 of said Block 1, 
thence north along the east side of Lot 6, Block 2, and 
north along a line near the center of Block 2 to Lincoln 
Lane, see plaintiffs' amended complaint, paragraph 3 (c) 
(R. 13) and Plat (R. 50), "blue" route. 
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After ·Clover Lane was established subsequent in 
1950, the water came to Lot 6 by the "red" route, plain-
tiffs' amended complaint, 3 (d) (R. 13) and Plat (R. 50). 
On or about July 1, 1952, the ditch in dispute was con-
structed, plaintiffs' amended complaint, 4(a), (R. 13). 
The ditch in dispute was never used to bring water to 
Lot 6 until 1955, plaintiffs' amended complaint, 4(b) 
(R. 14). The water would be more accessible to Lot 6 
by the original route existing at the time of dedication 
of the subdivision (R. 50), "blue" route. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
'THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS TO THE DEFENDAN1TS. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRI·CT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR ~COMPLAINT 
FOLLO·WING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
ARGUl\fENT 
POINT I 
'THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS TO THE DEFENDAN'TS. 
First Cause of Action 
The court having taken the allegations of plaintiffs' 
amended complaint as ad1nitted on July 16, 1959, and 
having allowed the plaintiffs to present a 1ne1norandum 
to cure inconsistencies and a plat showing the water 
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routes, did not err in granting the defendants' rnotion 
for surnmary judgment, the plaintiffs' pleadings and 
Ineinoranda sho,ving clearly (a) that at the time plain-
tiffs purchased through their predecessor Ford, there 
was no ditch in use where the disputed channel lies, 
plaintiffs' a1nended co1nplaint, 4(a) (R. 13 and 14), and 
(b) prior to 1955 \Vater had never come to Lot 6 across 
the '''"est side of Lot 3, plaintiffs' amended complaint, 
4 (b) ( R. 13) . 
Second Cause of Acti~on 
Plaintiffs' second cause of action incorporates the 
first cause \vhich shows the present ditch used only 
since 1955, giving no prescriptive rights, plaintiffs' 
an1ended complaint, 4(b) (R. 14) and plat (R. 15). 
Third Cause of Action 
Plaintiffs' pleadings affirmative show that since the 
time of dedication of the subdivision the water has come 
to Lot 6 by three distinct routes, two of which are more 
accessible to the source of the water than the route over 
which plaintiffs claim a right-of-way (Plat, R. 50). Fur-
ther, the shares of water owned by the plaintiffs are 
shares in a private irrigation company, plaintiffs' amend-
ed complaint, 2 (b) (R. 12), and as such, are by statute 
not appurtenant to the land, 73-1-10, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953. 
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Fourth .and Fifth Causes of Action 
The fourth and fifth causes of action of the plain-
tiffs' amended complaint (R. 12-18) are moot. 
The District Court took the matter of summary 
judgment under advisement on July 16, 1959, and at 
plaintiffs' request allowed plaintiff to file a memorandum 
prior to ruling. In the memorandum, plaintiffs set forth 
facts uncontested by the defendants which showed both 
parties' chain of title (plaintiffs' memorandum, R. 41) 
showing that Alliance Realty Company had acquired and 
disposed of Lot 6 prior to acquiring Lot 3. Lot 6 was 
sold to Carl Ford by Alliance on December 19, 1950, and 
Lot 3 was not acquired by Alliance Realty until July 20, 
1951. 
In July of 1952, when the ditch was constructed, 
plaintiffs' amended complaint, 4(a) (R. 13), ·Carl Ford 
owned Lot 6 and Alliance Realty owned Lot 3, hence no 
unity of title while the ditch was in use. 
The complaint and the memoranda set forth that 
the water came to Lot 6 prior to 1955 by the "red" route 
(R. 50), and in spite of this plaintiffs alleged that the 
ditch on the west of Lot 3 was obvious, visible and in 
continual use when the defendant took title to Lot 3 in 
1955. Either one position or the other is untenable. 
In plaintiffs' brief various cases are cited purport-
ing to uphold their amended complaint. Said cases are 
cited and discussed both in plaintiffs' brief and in the 
plaintiffs' memorandum which is made a part of the 
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record before this court. All cases are readily distin-
guishable from the case at bar. Adamson v. Brockbank, 
112 Utah 52, 185 P(2d) 264, which sets forth various 
elements which plaintiffs claim fit the instant case, is a 
case where the Brockbank holdings carried a servitude 
with the Adamson holdings being the dominant estate. 
There is a direct privity between the grantor to each 
party and the parties involved in the lawsuit. The ditch 
in that case had been in continuous use, and Brockbank 
was enough aware of that use and the servitude arising 
from the ditch that he had fraudulently acquired a quit-
claim deed to that easement. The Brockbank case set 
forth the essential elements to constitute an easement by 
severance as follows : 
(1) Unity of title followed by severance; 
(2) That at the time of the severance the 
servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible; 
(3) That the easement is reasonably neces-
sary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and 
( 4) It must usually be continuous and self-
acting, as distinguished from one used only from 
time to time when occasion arises. 
With respect to unity of title at severance: In the 
instant case at the time of severance according to plain-
tiffs' facts, the ditch was running along the "blue" route 
(R. 50), and ran from the present site of Lot 6 to the 
present site of Lot 3, and there was at that time no servi-
tude in Lot 3 and no dominant estate in Lot 6 creating a 
servitude in Lot 3. 
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Plaintiffs allege a unity of title at the time of con-
veyance of Lot 6, complaint, paragraph 5(a) (R. 14), 
but rebut said unity in the chain of title set forth by 
plaintiffs (R. 41). 
They claim obvious notice to the defendant of a 
servitude by alleging subdividing and dedication of a 
subdivision in 1947 (R. 41), severance in 1950 (R. 41), 
and then allege construction of a ditch in 1952, and still 
claim an obvious and visible servitude (plaintiffs' brief, 
page 8). 
Again in Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Penn. 178, 86 Am. 
Dec. 577, a servitude between two estates is set forth 
which existed at the time of severance. In the instant 
case there had never been a servitude in which Lot 6 was 
the dominant estate and Lot 3 the servient estate at any 
time while there was a unity of ownership. This is plain-
ly set forth by the plaintiffs' pleadings and plaintiffs' 
memoranda, and plaintiffs' map or plat. 
Plaintiffs' third claim is reasonable necessity. The 
plaintiffs allege three ditch routes to Lot 6 (see Plat, R. 
50) from the same water source, the last by which they 
claim an easement over Lot 3 existing since 1955 after 
both parties had received title to their lots. However, 
under all plaintiffs' pleadings it is apparent that (a) the 
ditch existing at the time of the dedication of the sub-
division in 1947 ("blue" route, R. 50) was discontinued, 
and (b) the ditch over which this litigation arose in the 
rear five feet of Lot 3 had never been of benefit to Lot 
6 prior to 1955, the first time, according to plaintiffs' 
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pleadings, that water had come to Lot 6 through this 
ditch. It is obvious from the plaintiffs' plat and from 
their pleadings that a more reasonable route for the 
water from its source to Lot 6 is on the original or "blue" 
route (R. 50) "rherein it involves only two lots in Block 
1, a much shorter route than the "red" route or the 
ublack" route set forth by the plaintiffs. 
As to the question of a utility easement, the plain-
tiffs as a sideline attempt to claim that the portion of 
each lot, to wit, the rear five feet reserved as a utility 
easement was intended and should be construed as con-
taining a ditch for irrigation vvater. Holladay Heights 
Plat "A" in its dedication carried the reservation of a 
five foot utility easement at the rear of each lot and 
betvveen Lots 7 and 8 of Block 1. Plaintiffs' Plat with 
the various ditch routes (R. 50) sets forth graphically 
that the "blue" or original route existing at the time of 
dedication of the subdivision is the logical route for the 
\\'ay of necessity to Lot 6 and obviates the claim of neces-
sity for the ditch in litigation. 
If their claim that the utility easements contem-
plated irrigation water as a utility was valid, the ease-
ments between Lots 7 and 8 of Block 1, Holladay Heights 
Plat "A", would be just as available and more convenient 
by several hundred feet than either the "red" or the 
4
'black" route, and by plaintiffs' own pleadings this was 
the source of water to the ground encompassed by Lot 6 
for some thirty-five years prior to 1950 and also at the 
time of dedication of the subdivision in 1947. True, the 
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"black" route claimed by the plaintiff is the only route 
which would obviate the necessity of a ditch across plain-
tiffs' own Lot 6, or does the plaintiff contend that Lots 7 
and 8 of Block 1 are entitled to have an easement across 
Lot 6, Block 2, because at the time of dedication of the 
subdivision in 1947 water ran in a ditch from Lots 7 and 
8 to Lot 6, Block 2. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT 
FOLLO·WING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The plaintiffs contend that their motion to set aside 
the summary judgment was timely due to notification by 
mail on July 31, 1959, and that notice by mail extends the 
time for three days under U.R.C.P. 1953. However, they 
forget that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1953 do 
not require notice of entry of judgment. Rule 59(b) 
provides that a motion for new trial shall be served with-
in ten days of entry of judgment and differs from 104-
40-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943 in that the present rule 
requires no notice of entry of judgn1ent in an action not 
tried to a jury. 
Plaintiffs' motions for new trial, to amend, and to 
maintain the status quo were not timely but were denied 
by the court on their own merits rather than the matter 
of time. 
Plaintiff filed t'vo second a1nended complaints but 
never obtained leave of court for such filing in accord-
ance with Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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1953 (see order dated August 11, 1959, R. 27-28.). 
While defendants agree that amendments should be 
liberally allowed in the interests of justice and on timely 
application, it is apparent from the record in the case at 
bar that ap·plication was not made for the second amend-
ed complaint nor for the amended complaint in lieu of 
the second amended complaint until after judgment had 
been entered by Judge Hanson and after time for filing 
for new trial had expired. The pleadings as a whole, 
including the second amended complaint do not state a 
cause of action, and a cause of action cannot be stated in 
the instant case. By plaintiffs' own pleadings it is ap-
parent that there has never been a servitude in Lot 3 
with Lot 6 being a dominant estate, and the time that 
the contested portion of the ditch has been used is not 
sufficient to create either a prescriptive right or a right 
by adverse possession, and plaintiffs' pleadings further 
show (as does their plat) that there is no right-of-way 
by reasonable necessity. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, it is urged that the lower court's sum-
mary judgment be affirmed and defendants and re-
spondents be granted their costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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